Cyprus, Cyberspies and the Dark Side of Israeli Intel
One tactic that strategic consultants, crisis management
experts and spin doctors would immediately suggest to help with Tal Dilian’s
current plight would be to place a lengthy and flattering fluff piece about him
in one of the major papers.
But Dilian, a former senior Military Intelligence officer
and CEO of spy-tech company WiSpear, probably has little appetite for more
press right now. In August, he gave an interview to Forbes Magazine, with the
aim of promoting his business. But that plan backfired in spectacular fashion
last month.
Dilian is now wanted for questioning after he showcased a
van that he had outfitted with advanced surveillance equipment. He had proudly
talked up this mobile intelligence vehicle, which was immediately confiscated
by the police, after that rather unusual Forbes interview. The van, whose price
ranges from $5 million to $9 million, has equipment and software that can pull
information from cellular and WiFi networks such as WhatsApp chats, Facebook
Messenger chats, contact lists, lists of recent calls and messages from any
smartphone within a half-kilometer radius.
Dilian is of course furious at the Cypriot authorities, who
suspect the equipment was meant to be used in the illegal surveillance of
competitors. On Thursday, three employees of WiSpear, which is registered in
Cyprus, were arrested as part of the investigation into Dilian. A Larnaca court
ordered their release two days later, but The Guardian reports that they are
expected to stand trial for violating privacy laws, fraudulently obtaining
documents and violating communications laws.
Cyprus has served for decades as a convenient base for
espionage. Israelis, Brits, Turks, Greeks, Americans, Russians, Palestinians,
Syrians, Saudis and others, spooks and “civilians” alike, all operate there, in
part by registering companies in the country. In the past decade, they have
been joined by a good number of former Israeli intelligence officers.
Cyprus offers tax benefits and shelters, as well as
proximity to Arab states that facilitates the sale, brokerage and export of
defense and cyber technologies to countries like Oman, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates.
Dilian is a prominent veteran of Israel’s intelligence
community. In his final position (where he held the rank of colonel), he
commanded MI’s technology unit, a top- secret unit whose activity, like the
identity of its members, is closely guarded. It includes conscripts, career
officers and civilian IDF employees. It could be described as the intelligence
community’s “toy factory.” It’s where inventors develop and manufacture devices
for intelligence missions and other special operations. In intelligence parlance,
this combination of human intelligence gathering (HUMINT) and signals
intelligence (SIGINT) is HUGINT.
One problem with the unit, and other special operations
branches, is a mentality in which, due to a sense of sacred mission, the end is
nearly always felt to justify the means. And for the sake of the mission, it is
sometimes seen as acceptable to cut corners or take shortcuts for personal
benefit.
Dilian, too, was suspected of irregularities; a reprimand
was placed in his personnel file, and his promotion path was blocked. This led
to his retirement from the military in 2002, whereupon he became a serial
high-tech entrepreneur. His WiSpear company specializes in vehicle-based
cyberwarfare. He also owns, Intellexa, whose specializations include hacking
encrypted data traffic.
Just as the military uses technological tools to obtain
information, disrupt computerized systems and strike at the infrastructure that
operates them, in the civilian sphere the goal is to obtain information,
disrupt a rival’s moves and gain advantage.
The only difference is that the intelligence agencies that
are in the service of countries – at least the democratic ones – are supposed
to use these capabilities to benefit national security, while in the business
world intelligence operates for the benefit of individuals, companies and
corporations (as well as governments) for financial gain. Ostensibly, the line
that separates the two is sharp and clear. But in their eagerness to chase the
big money, Israeli intelligence firms increasingly findthemselves in the
twilight zone between the permissible and the prohibited.
Black Cube, co-founded by IDF special operations branch
veteran Dan Zorella, was been exposed as having crossed this line. Its people,
to their professional disgrace, were arrested for various espionage affairs in
Romania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Britain and the U.S.
Another example is NSO, whose founders include Shalev Hulio,
that developed the Pegasus spyware. NSO has been linked to the murder of a
journalist in Mexico, the hacking of the cellphones of human rights activists
in the Persian Gulf and also the monitoring of Saudi journalist Jamal
Khashoggi, who was murdered by Saudi agents in Istanbul in 2018. Dilian first
intelligence company, Circles, merged with NSO in 2014.
It was revealed recently that a company with close ties to
the UAE government that developed a powerful spy tool disguised as a messaging
app, employed MI veterans at its Cyprus offices. A private investigator
retained by NSO to investigate a wave of employee departures found that the
programmers all went to Cyprus, lured by the astronomical salaries offered by
DarkMatter.
Another Israeli company that found itself in the eye of a
media storm this year is AnyVision, developer of an advanced facial ID system.
One of the founders is Eylon Etshtein. NBC reported that the company’s product
is used by the Israeli security establishment to track and identify
Palestinians. Following this report, Microsoft decided last month to review its
investment in the company.
Dilian, Hulio, Zorella, Etshtein and many others, who are
more or less well-known, share numerous similarities. One, they always deny
that they have broken the law. Two, when they or their company are challenged
by controversy, they find shelter in patriotism. They quickly mobilize the
media to portray them as the “salt of the earth” and extravagantly praise their
products.
Three, they always claim their sole objective is to save humanity and
catch “the bad guys”: terrorists and criminals. Four, numerous employees of
Israeli spy firms are veterans of the defense establishment, including MI, who
continue to do for pay what they once did in uniform. Five, all are developing,
making and selling products suited to both military and civilian purposes. Six,
some do “reserve duty” by supplying services to the Israeli intelligence
community.
This crossing of boundaries isn’t just a problem of private
intelligence firms or their leaders. It also derives from the culture
inculcated by SIBAT, the Defense Ministry’s International Defense Cooperation
Directorate.
When the prevailing attitude is to avoid obstructing
possible deals and the ultimate goal is to sell more arms and defense equipment
to practically any customer, “the more the better,” it’s no wonder the Defense
Ministry, the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the state
prosecution, the military censor and the courts close ranks in the name of
information security.
Israel exports $6 billion worth of arms and defense
equipment annually and is one of the world’s 10 biggest exporters. Only rarely,
in cases of blatant corruption or serious security offenses, are investigations
opened, and as long as this situation continues, our arms dealers and peddlers
of advanced spy technology will continue to thrive. And, too often, they’ll
also give us a bad name.
In a written response, WiSpear said it only sells its
products to governments and is cooperating fully with Cypriot law enforcement.
“We intend to refute claims raised by the local media and initiated against us
by the communist party. Spins or lies will not change the fact that our van is
openly displayed for demonstration purposes in international exhibitions to
help governments combat terror and crime.”
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