The key to success of the Nigerian Deep Blue Project does not lie offshore
The Director-General of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), Dr Bashir Jamoh, has said that President Muhammadu Buhari will launch the Deep Blue maritime security project worth $195 million in Lagos on 10 June.
Ahead of the launch, Dryad Global analysts Mitch Thomas and
Archie O’Devlin consider where the key to success for the Nigerian Deep Blue
Project lies.
Nigeria’s delayed ‘Integrated National Security and
Waterways Protection Infrastructure’ framework, also known as The Deep Blue
Project (DBP), is finally set to commence this month, several years after it
was first announced.
The DBP is highly anticipated as it represents a
comprehensive enhancement of Nigeria’s maritime security capabilities, which is
intended to curb piracy, robbery, kidnapping, oil theft, smuggling, and illegal
trafficking of drugs and persons within its territorial waters and exclusive
economic zone. Whilst the aims of the DBP are multifaceted, the primacy of
effort is without question the fight against piracy and the delivery of
enhanced safety for seafarers, Dryad said.
“Its launch will see Nigeria consolidate its role as the
leading force in fighting piracy offshore throughout the region. However, it
comes at a time when the EU has recently launched its Coordinated Maritime
Presence initiative which is soon to be expanded with a Danish frigate. This
indicates that extra-territorial states with interests in the region are
beginning to shoulder some of the responsibility due to a shortfall in
collective responsibility of Gulf of Guinea littoral states.”
Dryad analysts believe that with mounting international
pressure on Nigeria and the wider Gulf of Guinea states to facilitate greater
security within the maritime domain, it is vital that projects like the DBP are
evaluated against their potential for success as a framework contributing to
wider regional security rather than at a merely national level. Further still,
it is vital to look at the evolution of risk within the Gulf of Guinea to
understand how effective such a framework may be in delivering long term
sustainable security to mariners throughout the region.
The DBP was first initiated in 2017 by the Minister of
Transportation, Rotimi Amaechi. One of the first steps involved the Nigerian
Government approving a maritime security contract with Israeli firm HLSI
Security Systems and Technologies Limited for asset procurement and leasing. In
2020, Amaechi requested further funds to hire fast intercept vessels for one
year, claiming the $195 million already approved for the same purpose had been
put on hold due to COVID-19. In total, Nigeria has allocated a tenth of its
defence budget to the DBP and is expected to deploy an increased range of
assets to tackle maritime insecurity including two Special Mission Vessels,
seventeen Fast Interceptor Boats, two Special Mission Aircraft, three
helicopters, four unmanned aerial vehicles and sixteen armoured vehicles.
Furthermore, to bolster intelligence gathering and sharing efforts, a command,
control, computer communication and information centre (C4i) has also been set
up in Kirikiri, Lagos.
“Against the backdrop of such a significant investment in
infrastructure and capability, it is logical that at a rudimental level, key
outputs from the DBP are likely to include increased monitoring and more
frequent patrolling, allowing Nigeria to exert a greater operational footprint
throughout its offshore domain. Through its investment in a C4i centre it is
likely that Nigeria will have greater capacity to develop a reactive posture in
response to developing incidents and coordinate activity with neighbouring
states. Finally, through its political investment onshore it is likely in turn
to result in a greater focus on maritime domain awareness and thus lead to a
reduction in the ‘sea blindness’ that has hampered efforts to date,” Dryad
said.
“Determining the success of the DBP in terms of improving
maritime security within Nigerian waters, and indeed at a regional level, is
however a more complex task than may first appear. To effectively benchmark
success, one must move beyond reductionist models that equate a decline in
offshore incidents in the Nigerian territorial waters and exclusive economic
zone as being a de facto indicator of successful outcomes resulting from the
DBP. Well established trends throughout the Gulf of Guinea clearly show the
fluid and dynamic nature of piracy. This can be seen in terms of pirates’
ability to select areas of operations based on a knowledge of the current
limitations of the in-place security architecture, and their ability to mount
increasingly complex operations within areas far removed from their centre of
gravity. Indeed, further evidence indicates that whilst the majority of
incidents now occur beyond Nigerian waters, pirates themselves continue to
originate almost exclusively from within Nigeria. For the DBP to be able to
claim success, Nigeria must achieve more than simply driving piracy into
neighbouring waters, it must ensure that the current areas of the southern
Niger Delta that are allowing Nigerian pirates the freedom of movement to mount
and sustain complex kidnap for ransom operations are themselves secured and
further still, the conditions within those areas that drive individuals towards
piracy are addressed accordingly,” according to Dryad.
Whilst any attempts to improve maritime security offshore
Nigeria is welcome, the maritime risk company said, “it is also the case that
the largely military approach to counter-piracy that dominates much of the DBP,
risks ignoring the complex interrelationship of socio-economic and governmental
factors that drive piracy and maritime crime. Hence why the conventional wisdom
in counter-piracy discourse states that the roots of piracy should ultimately
be addressed onshore. Land-based counter-piracy approaches can involve
programmes which focus on capacity building for law enforcement and policing,
or a development model, focussing on preventive programs or alternative
livelihood projects. As a signatory to the legally binding Lomé Charter,
Nigeria should be committed to put in place measures that that address Chapter
2, Article 5 of the Lomé Charter. This section of the charter recommends that
parties put in place measures that “create productive jobs and eliminate
extreme poverty”. The Charter also advocates for stronger social cohesion
through equitable policy implementation. The objective of effectively
combatting piracy offshore whilst failing to address the complex socio-economic
and governmental issues that are widespread within Nigeria is alarmingly
reductive in its approach.”
By implementing the DBP, Nigeria should be commended for
taking such a considerable step towards safeguarding its offshore domain,
however real success in addressing piracy throughout the Gulf of Guinea will
likely only be realised when littoral states effectively and collectively
respond to the onshore and offshore drivers of piracy, whilst strengthening
regional frameworks and providing a system of collectivised security. Until
such time, national projects occurring in isolation will only seek to drive
piracy elsewhere throughout the Gulf of Guinea and fail to deliver the required
safety of life at sea, Dryad believes.
“Even with the implementation of the DBP, regional
cooperation with frameworks such as the GOG-MCF/SHADE [Gulf of Guinea Maritime
Collaboration Forum] and ECOWAS, remain necessary. Without this cooperation,
pooling of resources and consideration of how regional responses might be
harnessed to promote regionwide, land-based counter-piracy initiatives, piracy
will continue to plague the Gulf of Guinea. Large scale projects with considerable
military hardware go a long way to addressing the resource scarcity that have
thus far undercut offshore counter piracy efforts, however without a mechanism
whereby such assets are used to regional effect and in conjunction with a clear
strategy for addressing the issue of piratical freedom of movement within
coastal areas, the issue is likely to continue,” Dryad concluded.
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