Ukraine’s anti-corruption effort struggles, but soldiers on
A Russian troop buildup is boosting anxiety about Ukraine’s sovereignty, but the central threat to Kyiv’s reform ambitions – the corrosive effect of grand corruption – comes from within. And more than seven years into Ukraine’s democracy rebuilding project, few would say Ukraine’s fight against graft is going smoothly.
In the years since the 2014 Euromaidan uprising prompted
Ukraine’s political direction to shift westward, two consecutive Ukrainian
presidential administrations have drawn criticism for either failing to
adequately tackle graft, or even perpetuating it. Meanwhile, corrupt actors
continue to take advantage of the country’s weak judicial system to further
their own interests, partly by attacking the fledgling anti-corruption
infrastructure that’s earned Kyiv international praise.
Yet advocates still see hope for Ukraine’s anti-corruption
drive and plead for patience in assessing its progress. Despite massive
pushback against institutions such as the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of
Ukraine (NABU) and the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC), experts say a string
of measured successes have established an important foundation for the future.
“From my point of view, we have more positive than negative
experiences,” says Andrii Borovyk, executive director of Transparency
International Ukraine.
With Ukraine’s democracy hanging in the balance, as well as
a population that remains deeply distrustful of state structures, maintaining
momentum is imperative. So is pursuing additional reforms: Declaring anything
close to victory over corruption will be impossible without overhauling the
broken judiciary, a linchpin of the old system.
So far, President Volodymyr Zelensky has committed to that
cause. But even if his administration has the political will to follow through,
it remains to be seen whether it will be enough to uproot a deeply engrained
culture.
Finally, a full arsenal
The relative success of Ukraine’s anti-graft effort has been
obscured by what Borovyk says are the lofty expectations of Ukrainians when it
comes to reform. Many hope for speedy change, when, in reality, fighting
corruption in Ukraine is a slow and steady march that is only beginning to
gather pace.
For one, the appropriate infrastructure was only recently
put in place. The September 2019 launch of the highly anticipated HACC
concluded a years-long process that began with the establishment of NABU, the
ProZorro procurement system and electronic asset declarations throughout 2015
and 2016. Upon closer inspection, each instrument has produced a series of
achievements.
Take NABU, which in its first few years has sent 300 cases
to court and obtained 50 convictions. Currently, some 800 investigations are
underway. One of its latest key moves came last month, when officials charged
three top former managers of PrivatBank, the notorious lender owned by Ihor
Kolomoisky, one of Ukraine’s richest citizens, with embezzlement.
The case against PrivatBank, which was nationalized in 2016
after officials discovered $5.5 billion missing from its balance sheet, has
been a focal point of international pressure on Kyiv to clean up. In targeting
former bank insiders, NABU is in the vanguard of what observers say is
Zelensky’s offensive to curb oligarch influence and curry favor with
Washington.
Elsewhere, the 38-judge HACC is working to punish dishonest
officials and judges at the local and regional levels across the country. Several
years in the making, and created with assistance from international experts,
the court fields cases from NABU and the Specialized Anti-Corruption
Prosecutor’s Office, earning a reputation for professionalism and efficiency.
It has handed down more than two dozen convictions and
created an important precedent by setting hefty sums for bail in some cases
involving high-profile defendants, according to Olena Shcherban, chief legal
expert at the Anti-Corruption Action Center in Kyiv. “All other courts had been
afraid to even consider such measures earlier,” she says. In doing so, it also
secures cash judgements that are funneled directly into the state budget.
Meanwhile, the e-declaration and ProZorro systems are the
most prominent steps yet at ensuring transparency within the state bureaucracy,
affording Ukrainians an extraordinary look at the backgrounds and dealings of
bureaucrats.
This year, nearly 800,000 officials submitted their annual
declarations to a searchable universal register. And statistically speaking,
ProZorro has produced perhaps the clearest measurable impact of all: According
to CEO Vasyl Zadvornyy, the award-wining procurement system, which is used in
determining state contracts for everything from medical supplies to road
construction, saved the Ukrainian state nearly $2 billion last year.
Besides guaranteeing a level of transparency in a
once-opaque process, Zadvornyy said the system is also a testament to the
country’s technical prowess. “We have something to be proud of,” he wrote on
Facebook on April 2, “because ProZorro is a 100 percent Ukrainian product.”
When crooked courts conspire
Such signs of progress come despite the continuing existence
of widespread corruption within the judiciary. Courts in some cases have
actively sabotaged reform efforts.
Last autumn, for example, Ukraine was plunged into crisis
after the Constitutional Court effectively ruled NABU illegal and stripped
e-declarations of their legal weight. Ukrainian activists allege those
decisions were orchestrated by Viktor Medvedchuk, a close Vladimir Putin ally,
and Kolomoisky – two tycoons seemingly interested in preserving their wealth
and keeping Western influence (as well as the transparency it brings) at bay
Lawmakers pushed through legislation reinstating the legal
liability for false asset declarations. But the larger question of how to
impose checks and balances on one of the most powerful courts in the land
remains unanswered. In a bid to showcase his assertiveness, Zelensky last month
dismissed its chief justice, Oleksandr Tupytsky, and one other judge by decree,
a move some critics say was legally dubious.
Meanwhile, the HACC has been hamstrung by the High Council
of Justice (HCJ) another institution that Shcherban contends has been captured
by corrupt interests. Responsible for monitoring the performance of the
country’s judges, the HCJ is instead widely perceived by reform advocates as
abusing its disciplinary powers to improperly influence anti-corruption cases.
For example, the HCJ officially reprimanded a HACC judge who attempted to
compel the notorious head of a politicized Kyiv court to show up for hearings
in a case against him.
Following an investigation by NABU, that official, Pavlo
Vovk, stands accused of attempting to establish control over the HCJ. He is
currently evading summonses. In early April, authorities arrested Vovk’s
brother for allegedly taking a $100,000 bribe on his behalf.
Leaving the HCJ to its own devices, Shcherban says, would
mean “a real risk that they’ll just start firing the judges who can’t be
pressured in any other way.”
That’s why local activists and Western diplomats alike are
urging the Ukrainian government to finally commit to meaningful judicial
reform, a process that’s been in limbo for years. Experts say the priorities
should include overhauling the HCJ and rebooting the High Qualifications
Commission, another state body that has stalled. Such changes are needed to
ensure professionalism and integrity in the judiciary.
Zelensky has repeatedly pledged in recent weeks that both
measures, among a raft of others, are part of his imminent judicial reform
strategy for the next two years. Leading legal experts have already criticized
his plan as vague and poorly conceived, though some might take heart in the
president’s submission this week of a bill finally dissolving the controversial
Kyiv court over which Vovk presides.
Still, others point to a sobering reality: Judicial
corruption is a deeply systemic phenomenon in which many actors have a stake.
“The state apparatus in general – law enforcement, the
presidential administration, the Cabinet of Ministers, parliament – is not
ready to have a real independent judiciary because no one wants to play by the
rules,” says Serhiy Verlanov, a former head of the State Tax Service of Ukraine
and a trained lawyer.
Will time tell?
Given the prevailing circumstances, on top of the decades of
rot experienced by state institutions, it’s no surprise that Ukrainians want
quick results. The challenge for reformers, however, is that there are no easy
fixes.
Changing public attitudes also pose a challenge. According
to a recent USAID-sponsored poll, 54 percent of respondents believe it’s
“impossible to live completely according to the law.” Perhaps even more
worrying, 68 percent said they were “willing to give power to a strong leader”
capable of establishing “order” in the country.
“People believe in some kind of king or tsar who will come
and solve all their problems,” says Borovyk, of Transparency International.
“But this will never happen within one, two or three years.”
Complicating things for reformers is the strong anti-Western
stance adopted by media outlets and lawmakers loyal to Medvedchuk and
Kolomoisky. These affiliated entities and individuals have stirred discontent
by depicting Ukraine as a slave to Western governments and organizations such
as the International Monetary Fund, which has helped keep the country’s economy
afloat.
With the recent election of Joe Biden, Kyiv has seen an ally
reemerge in Washington. The Biden administration has already broadcast its
support both symbolically, exemplified by a recent telephone call between the
two presidents, and in substance, by sanctioning Kolomoisky over unspecified
corruption in Ukraine.
With three years left in his term, Zelensky, along with his
parliamentary majority, still have ample time to press ahead with substantive
changes, says Verlanov, the former State Tax Service chief. But there is no
time to lose, and little margin for error.
In the meantime, reformers should continue preparing for
serious pushback: “There will always be people who will be unhappy with the
anti-corruption infrastructure,” says Borovyk. “Especially if it’s doing what
it’s supposed to do.”
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