Why Saudi Arabia Will Lose The Next Oil Price War
Saudi Arabia has instigated two oil price wars in the last
decade and has lost both. Given its apparent inability to learn from its
mistakes it may well instigate another one but it will lose that as well. In
the process, it has created a political and economic strait-jacket for itself
in which the only outcome is its eventual effective bankruptcy.
The principal target for Saudi Arabia in both of its recent
oil price wars has been the U.S. shale industry. In the first oil price war
from 2014 to 2016, the Saudi’s objective was to halt the development of the
U.S. shale sector by pushing oil prices so low through overproduction that so
many of its companies went bankrupt that the sector no longer posed a threat to
the then-Saudi dominance of the global oil markets. In the second oil price war
which only just ended, the main Saudi objective was exactly the same, with the
added target of stopping U.S. shale producers from scooping up the oil supply
contracts that were being unfilled by Saudi Arabia as the Kingdom complied with
the oil production cuts mandated by various OPEC and OPEC+ output cut
agreements.
In the run-up to the first oil price war, the Saudis can be
forgiven for thinking that they stood a chance of destroying the
then-relatively nascent U.S. shale sector. It was widely assumed that the
breakeven price across the U.S. shale sector was US$70 per barrel and that this
figure was largely inflexible. Saudi Arabia also held record high foreign
assets reserves of US$737 billion at the time of launching the first oil war.
This allowed it room for manoeuvre in sustaining its economically crucial
SAR-US$-currency peg and in covering any budget deficits that would be caused
by the oil price fall. At a private meeting in October 2014 in New York between
Saudi officials and other senior figures in the global oil industry, the Saudis
were ‘extremely confident’ of securing a victory ‘within a matter of months’, a
New York-based banker with close knowledge of the meeting.
This, the Saudis thought, would not only permanently disable the U.S, shale
industry but would also impose some supply discipline on other OPEC members.
As it transpired, of course, the Saudis had disastrously
misjudged the ability of the U.S. shale sector to reshape itself into a much
meaner, leaner, and lower-cost flexible industry. Many of the better operations
in the core areas of the Permian and Bakken, in particular, were able to
breakeven at price points above US$30 per barrel and to make decent profits at
points above US$37 per barrel area, driven in large part through advances in
technology and operational agility. After two years of attrition, the Saudis
caved in, having moved from a budget surplus to a then-record high deficit in
late 2015 of US$98 billion. It had also spent at least US$250 billion of its
precious foreign exchange reserves over that period that were lost forever. In
an unprecedented move for a serving senior Saudi politician, the country’s
deputy economic minister, Mohamed Al Tuwaijri, stated unequivocally in 2016 that:
“If we [Saudi Arabia] don’t take any reform measures, …then we’re doomed to
bankruptcy in three to four years.”
The even more enduring legacy of this first oil price war,
though – and part of the reason why the Saudis could never hope to win the last
one, or any future oil price war either – is that it created the resilience of
the U.S. shale sector as it now stands. This means that the U.S. shale sector
as a whole can cope with extremely low oil prices for a lot longer than it
takes Saudi Arabia to be bankrupted by them. Saudi Arabia has much greater
fixed costs attached to its oil sector, regardless of how low market prices go.
Before the onset of the latest oil price war, the Kingdom had an official
budget breakeven price of US$84 per barrel of Brent but, given the economic
damage done by this latest price war folly, it is much higher now. By stark
contrast, the U.S. shale sector that Saudi crucially helped to shape in the
first oil price war is now so nimble that US$25-30 per barrel of WTI is enough
to bring some of the production back on line, as long as operators believe that
prices will not fall and hold below the US$20 per barrel level. But, even if
prices are below that key US$25-30 per barrel level, it does not matter to the
long-term survivability of the U.S. shale sector as the key players are able to
shut down wells instantly as and when needed and to start up them up again
within a week as demand requires. In sum: in any oil price war, the Saudis
simply cannot wait out the U.S. shale sector.
On the other hand, though – in a rising oil price
environment - the Saudis are also doomed. This is because the U.S. – even
before the latest oil price war – had intimated that it would not tolerate oil
prices above around US$70 per barrel of Brent. When the oil price rose last
year during the March-October period consistently above US$70 per barrel level,
U.S, President Donald Trump Tweeted about Saudi Arabia’s King Salman that: “He
would not last in power for two weeks without the backing of the U.S. military.”
The US$70 per barrel level is considered one that brings into view oil price
levels that might pose problems for the U.S. economy. Specifically, it is
estimated that every US$10 per barrel change in the price of crude oil results
in a 25-30 cent change in the price of a gallon of gasoline, and for every 1
cent that the average price per gallon of gasoline rises, more than US$1
billion per year in consumer spending is lost.
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