Why is Bashar Al Assad really targeting Rami Makhlouf?
Last week, Syrians and those who follow the latest
developments in Damascus witnessed a rare sight: a public feud within the inner
sanctum of the Syrian regime. Rami Makhlouf, an oligarch who controls most of
the country’s economy, implored President Bashar Al Assad in a series of
Facebook videos apparently filmed from his own villa to call off a tax evasion
probe that threatens to destroy his business empire.
Failure to do so might lead the country to suffer, Mr
Makhlouf indicated, as though the half-a-million who died so far in nine years
of war had not already accomplished that.
It was a spectacular fall from favour by a pillar of the
Syrian regime who has played a key role in the systematic stripping of Syria’s
wealth from its citizens. But the saga, which pulled back the curtain to reveal
some of the machinations of Mr Al Assad’s inner circle, shows that, for all the
regime’s military victories, Syria will never enjoy a measure of peace or
tranquility without serious reforms.
Mr Makhlouf is the scion of an enormous business empire
whose crown jewel and cash cow is the telecoms operator Syriatel. He reportedly
controls somewhere between 60 and 70 per cent of Syria’s economy. Corruption
and patronage personified, Mr Makhlouf was until now a crucial ally of Bashar
Al Assad.
In addition to bankrolling the Syrian state, Mr Makhlouf has
built a paramilitary force that numbers in the thousands and his charitable
organisation, Al Bustan, has continued to support impoverished families in the
regime’s heartland, building a base of popular support that Mr Al Assad risks
alienating through his crackdown on the Makhlouf empire.
The latest dispute stems from an investigation by the Syrian
state, the results of which allege that Syriatel and its main competitor owe
more than 200 billion Syrian pounds (Dh1.4bn) of back taxes to the government.
If paid, that sum could lead to Syriatel’s collapse.
In many ways, however, the Makhlouf saga is indicative of
the deeper rot and inherent instability at the core of a regime that has
survived a debilitating, nine-year uprising and civil war through brutal
popular suppression, bankrolled and militarily backed by foreign powers.
The result is the emergence of competing centres of power
that will continue vying for the spoils. The saga further indicates that Syria
will remain a tinderbox, even after military conflict dissipates, because that
systemic rot (which is, of course, what drove Syrians to rise up in the first
place) has not been addressed.
Consider the timing of the crackdown. The Syrian economy is
buckling under the weight of providing basic, essential services to its
citizens. Having long been quarantined from international markets by US sanctions,
it is also under a partial lockdown from a domestic coronavirus outbreak. As
the presumptive military victor in the war, the Al Assad regime has been
obstinate in its refusal to participate in any serious peace talks or consider
reform, which has meant an indefinite delay in reconstruction funds from
abroad.
Meanwhile, the economy of the regime’s main military backer
and guarantor, Russia, is also struggling under the pandemic and the related
collapse in the price of oil. All of this has accelerated Moscow’s demands for
a resolution to the Syrian crisis and its frustration at the regime’s
stubbornness and corruption. There are loud critiques emanating from many
Kremlin proxies and surrogates, who question just how necessary Al Assad really
is to Syria’s post-war order.
These tensions within Damascus and amongst its core allies
are only emerging now that the immediate military threat to the regime’s
survival has been quelled, in much the same way that the myriad of underlying
conflicts in Syria re-emerged after the defeat of ISIS. These power struggles
and jockeying are likely to continue for the foreseeable future, at least up to
the next constitutional deadline in 2021, when presidential elections are
scheduled to take place.
The most likely scenario is that Mr Al Assad will be
nominated for another presidential term, though that has not prevented
speculation that another figure might be presented – even his wife Asma’s name
has circulated as a potential candidate. A former banker from London, she has
stood by her husband throughout the war and runs the Syria Trust for
Development, which controls most of the charitable and civil society sector in
the country.
If you are having trouble thinking of any other potential
replacements for Bashar Al Assad, you are not alone. Even the Russian government
proxies who criticise the Syrian president point out that there aren’t any
realistic options left – partly a consequence of the scorched earth policy of
relentless violence and forced displacement pursued by Damascus and its allies.
This brings us back to Rami Makhlouf, whose saga has yet to
unfold fully. Public disputes within the regime’s inner circle are a rare
sight, and Mr Makhlouf, Syria’s perennial oligarch, retains many levers of
power, including his militia. But he is unlikely to pose a serious challenge to
Mr Al Assad. He had simply grown too powerful, and clipping his wings was part
of the Syrian president’s ongoing efforts to balance the interests of his
allies and rivals against each other, all the while maintaining his own place
at the apex of the crumbling edifice that is Syria.
For all of the possible scenarios and resolutions to this
latest crisis, it is important to keep in mind a simple and blunt fact. The
Syrian regime is akin to a mafia in control of a genocidal police state, and
Bashar Al Assad and Rami Makhlouf together brutalised Syrians. The latest
episode is merely the pruning and sacrifice of a loyal underling who became a
potential rival. As long as Syria is ruled by this regime, the potential for an
implosion remains high.
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