The surprising dynamic of Greek-Israeli ties
During 2019, in the good old pre-coronavirus times, more
than 700,000 Israelis visited Greece. They were dining in tavernas in the
Peloponnese, walking in Vikos, singing along in one of Athens’ bouzouki clubs,
buying summer homes on Crete and Lefkada, or visiting Greek industrial
partners. Greek and Israeli military forces were holding joint exercises. All
that in the friendliest atmosphere. Neither the Israelis nor their Greek hosts
realized that this phenomenon of real brotherhood was something that could not
always be taken for granted.
On May 21, 1990, Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos
Mitsotakis recognized the State of Israel de jure, finally establishing full
diplomatic relations between Israel and Greece. In fact, it was during his
election campaign that Mitsotakis declared that his first act as prime minister
would be the signing of the recognition of the State of Israel, which he later
did. Through this act, he symbolically put an end to almost four decades of
“lost time” in ties between the two old nations.
“As obvious as that decision [to recognize Israel] seems to
us now, that was a far cry from the case 28 years ago, because Greek public
opinion at the time was staunchly pro-Arab and anti-Israel,” said his son,
Kyriakos Mitsotakis, the current prime minister of Greece, in a speech to the
American Jewish Committee Global Forum in 2018.
Indeed, Greek policy toward Israel until that historic
decision was mainly dictated by a zero-sum game perception: the need for the
Arab world to support Greece on the Cyprus issue and to assure the supply of
oil meant cold, low-level relations with Israel.
Supporting the Palestinian cause during the 1980s was
reflected in Greece through emotional public support of those interests. But,
slowly but surely, this attitude began to fade.
The 1990s brought about the Arab-Israeli peace process and
the status of Israel in the world changed. It was the decade of rapprochement
between Israel and Turkey, and it looked like Turkey was going to be Israel’s
strategic partner. It took Jerusalem and Athens another decade to realize that
the zero-sum game rules no longer apply.
Assuming his position as ambassador to Greece in 2003, Ram
Aviram thought that the preparations for the 2004 Athens Olympic Games provided
an opportunity for the two sides to embark on what would later become a
strategic alliance. Israel was asked to be part of the small intimate group
which assisted Greece in its anti-terror policy for the security of the Games.
In 2005, the first ever visit by a Greek minister of defense to Israel took
place. Yet there was some hesitation on the Israeli side in promoting relations
with Athens, still hoping not to harm the strategic defense ties between Israel
and Turkey. In 2006, when Dora Bakoyannis took over as Greek foreign minister,
Israel’s legitimacy was greatly promoted with the first visit by a president of
Israel to Greece. The idea of Israeli flags flying in central avenues of Athens
during such a visit would have been unthinkable a few years earlier.
At that time, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs under
the leadership of Bakoyannis was particularly active in its attempts to resolve
the Arab-Israeli conflict, with initiatives and targeted activities including
the participation of Greece, for the first time ever, in the meetings of the
Annapolis Conference. What is more, during the Greek Presidency of the United
Nations’ Security Council, there was an effort to further discuss the issues at
the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict. During that period, because of the good
Greek-Arab relationship, and due to the reinstated good relations with Israel,
Greece emerged as a potential honest broker in the region. This period was also
marked by the intense efforts of consecutive Greek governments to eradicate
public displays of anti-Semitism. A National Holocaust Remembrance Day was
established in Greece.
By the end of the first decade of the 2000s, two major
tectonic events took place that affected Greek-Israeli relations even further:
Anti-Israeli policy became a cornerstone of the policy of the regime of Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Israel, Cyprus and Greece discovered strategic
natural gas fields in the Mediterranean and thought of ways to cooperate in
transporting the gas to Europe. Now the time was also ripe for a shift in attitude
on the Israeli side, paving the way for flourishing relations. Since 2010, an
alliance has been forged between Greece and Israel in all facets of life,
created by a deep acknowledgment of converging interests and democratic values.
There is communication between the Israeli and Greek prime ministers on a
regular basis. Moreover, fruitful cooperation is developing between the Israeli
and Greek defense industries, where highly sophisticated systems are moving
from Israel to Greece but also in the other direction. There is also
multi-partisan support for strong relations between Greece and Israel on the
Greek domestic political scene that now includes parties on the Left that have
realized the value of good ties with Israel in challenging times for the world
and our region. Greek-Israeli relations are no longer a token in Greek domestic
party politics.
On a trilateral level, there are frequent leadership summits
between Israel, Greece and Cyprus. Strategically, Greece, Israel and Cyprus are
working together on all levels from prime ministers to military forces to
ensure a variety of common interests in fields such as energy, the environment,
culture, innovation and security, among others.
It is no coincidence that at a time when the two countries
are considering reopening themselves to the world in the coronavirus era, they
are looking at connections between each other as the first priority. It seems
that Israel has found its “strategic depth” looking toward the Aegean Sea and
Greece has found a reliable partner in an unstable region – this time for many
years to come. Indeed, what was begun by Konstantinos Mitsotakis 30 years ago
is bearing fruit.
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