Pro-Moldova party linked to oligarch Plahotnuic strengthens position in parliament
Pro-Moldova, a faction that split in February from the
Moldovan Democratic Party (PDM), has been joined by a seventh MP, Gheorghe
Brasovschi.
The PDM was headed by oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc, for years
Moldova’s most powerful politician, until it lost power in July 2019.
Plahotnuic fled Moldova immediately after the PDM was ousted from power by a
short-lived alliance between the pro-Russian Socialists and pro-EU ACUM bloc.
The recent formation of Pro-Moldova, headed by one of
Plahotniuc’s closest allies, former parliament speaker Andrian Candu, has led
to speculation that the businessman and politician could ultimately be planning
a return to Moldova.
The faction split from the PDM, which it accused of having
allegedly carried out secret negotiations with the Socialist Party (PSRM).
Pro-Moldova positions itself as a pro-EU party, a strategy that recalls the
Plahotniuc era, thus raising legitimate questions about whether it would
compete with former prime minister Maia Sandu and her Action and Solidarity
Party (PAS) for the position of President Igor Dodon’s and the Socialists’ main
challenger.
Separately, Candu’s personal ties with Plahotniuc, his marriage
godfather, makes the party prone to becoming a political vehicle in principle
available for the former leader to return to the country under more favourable
circumstances. Plahotnuic, now the subject of an international arrest warrant,
is supposed to have self-exiled in Miami.
The political rhetoric of Pro-Moldova is similar to the
pro-EU narrative previously used by the PDM and Plahotniuc to build their
pro-Western image, while maintaining firm control over the country’s
centralised economy and corrupt justice. As this control deepened, observers
including the European Commission warned of the growing decree of state capture
in Moldova.
Now that the political project backed by Moldova’s western
development partners last June — the coalition between ACUM and the Socialists
—has collapsed, Pro-Moldova might expect to become the leading pro-EU force in
Moldova and the main recipient of political support from its western partners.
Separate, unrelated developments support this scenario.
Firstly, Andrei Nastase, the leader of Dignity and Truth political party
(PPDA), has announced his presidential candidacy. In the previous presidential
elections, the PPDA collaborated with Sandu’s PAS and Sandu came close to
winning the election, only losing out to Dodon in the second round. Polls
indicate Sandu is again the main challenger to Dodon in the presidential
elections scheduled for this autumn while Nastase would be surpassed by even
former prime minister and current PDM leader Pavel Filip.
The lack of cooperation between the PPDA and PAS leaves the
door open for Pro-Moldova to become the main ally of Moldova’s western
development partners.
The return of Plahotniuc to Moldova could then follow.
Opinions that Moldova’s western partners should support Plahotniuc as “the only
check on Dodon” are already being put forward in foreign media. A column
published by US News on February 24 suggests that the US proved
“counterproductive” when its secretary of state barred Plahotniuc from entering
the US for “significant corruption”. In essence, the column argues Plahotniuc
would make a reasonable ally of western (US included) partners in Moldova.
“Dodon has been able to blacken Plahotniuc's reputation with charges that
absolutely lack basis,” wrote Christina Petru, Ph.D, a retired economist, and
Olga Kousi, an academic with specific provenance in the CIS/CEE.
The argument is debatable at least because it overlooks the
role played by Plahotniuc in the past and his proven lack of capacity to drive
changes towards rule of law and market economy in Moldova.
Separately, there are other pro-EU forces in Moldova that
are better positioned in terms of electoral support to fight against Dodon.
Sandu’s past cooperation with Dodon’s Socialists does not necessarily
invalidate her as Dodon’s main challenger. The ACUM-PSRM coalition not only was
blessed by the US and EU, but it was open and public, as opposed to
Plahotniuc’s hidden cooperation with Dodon for several years before June 2019.
In fact, supporting Plahotniuc as “the only check on Dodon”
would mean a return to the pre-June 2019 situation, which means limited
technical reforms (like better banking regulations) but no progress in the
fight against corruption, rule of law or market economy. In other words,
Dodon’s obscure relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle
do not necessarily qualify Plahotniuc as Moldova’s leading pro-western player.
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