HOW RUSSIA HELPED THE UNITED STATES FIGHT HUAWEI IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Thirty years of independence from communism and the Soviet
Union have also meant 30 years of fear of a Russian invasion for Central and
Eastern European countries. As a result, these countries have spent three
decades consolidating relations with the United States and NATO — both of which
they see as possible saviors in an existential crisis.
The United States has become the number one partner of many
Central and Eastern European countries. Ties with Washington are the bedrock of
their defense and diplomatic strategies. Not surprisingly, it has become
natural for policymakers in these countries to be very sensitive to anything
that could jeopardize their relations with the United States.
That is why the only three countries with which Washington
has signed memoranda of understanding targeting Huawei are Romania, Poland, and
Estonia. Regional policymakers are less concerned about the possible threat
from Huawei, and more concerned that failing to side with the United States on
this issue would risk losing Washington’s support in a crisis with Russia.
China and Huawei find themselves caught in the geopolitical realities of the
region: They have failed to understand the “Russian factor” and the loyalty
that Central and Eastern Europe have toward the United States and NATO, which
has been repeatedly highlighted over the years.
Coming to an Understanding in Central and Eastern Europe
The use of memoranda of understanding, although a very old
tool of foreign diplomacy, has been popularized worldwide most recently at the
state-to-state level by China through its Belt and Road Initiative. The Belt
and Road Initiative includes a plethora of memoranda of understanding signed
between China and numerous other countries, all gathered under the branding
name of the Belt and Road Initiative, or its nickname, the “New Silk Road.”
China’s frequent use of these memoranda. , many of which never materialized,
has been a target of criticism
For its part, the United States has begun signing memoranda
of understanding with countries that agree not to use Huawei and its 5G
technology. America has focused these efforts on Central and Eastern Europe. It
all started with Romania in August 2019
during a visit to Washington by Romanian President Klaus Iohannis. The
two countries signed a memorandum of understanding through which, without
mentioning Huawei, Romania committed not to use technology from any company
that isn’t independent from government influence, lacks a transparent ownership
structure, or has engaged in unethical behavior. Romania was soon followed by
Poland and more recently by Estonia. The U.S. government didn’t seem to tailor
its agreements to each of these European countries, instead using a universal
blueprint for all of them. Yet, Romania, Poland, and Estonia all share a fear
of Russia and are strongly committed to the United States.
One possible explanation for their willingness to sign these
memoranda about Huawei could be the region’s experience with communism and
state surveillance. But if this were the case, there would have been wariness
toward Huawei in the past. And yet, the company acquired considerable market
share in 3G and 4G gear in the region. In fact, Huawei’s expansion went unabated
for years. Doubts only started creeping in after the U.S. lobby and pressure
campaign against Huawei and China began, in 2018.
The Chinese memorandum of understanding model was thus
successfully co-opted by the United States in its extensive policy of economic
containment of Huawei. However, these bilateral agreements don’t have any power
unless they are reinforced by a local law. They are more of a statement than a
decisive blow against Huawei.
In Romania, more than six months after the government signed
the memorandum of understanding, there is still no legal act excluding Huawei.
The new right-wing government, which came to power in November 2019, was
expected to pass a government executive act that would have made the memorandum
of understanding’s provisions national law. But the government was recently
dismissed through a motion of no-confidence, meaning that such an act cannot be
passed by the caretaker government, which leaves Huawei’s fate up in the air.
Both the limits and the usefulness of the Romanian
memorandum of understanding could be seen in the Romanian telecommunications
authority’s October 2019 decision to postpone until 2020 the public auction for
selling the frequencies through which 5G services will be provided. This was
done in order to give the government more time to pass a law that provides the memorandum legal power. While the
memorandum of understanding didn’t itself ban Huawei, it was the basis for the
decision to postpone the action. Without it, the auction would have probably
taken place without any restrictions imposed on the acquisition of Huawei 5G
gear by telecommunications operators, many of which already use Huawei for
their 3G and 4G networks.
Poland’s story is more interesting. At the start of the
decade, Poland began developing a friendlier attitude toward China, hoping to
unlock economic opportunities. The first summit of heads of government between
China and 16 Central and Eastern European countries — the then-16+1 mechanism —
took place in Warsaw in 2012. Poland was later the first Central and Eastern
European country to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as a
founding member. But the expected opportunities and investments from China
never materialized. In the meantime, after the Russian annexation of Crimea and
the war in Donbass, it was the threat from Russia that became Warsaw’s number
one concern. Weighing between unfulfilled investment promises coming from China
and its national security regarding Russia, Poland chose to prioritize its
relationship with the United States, standing by Washington’s side in its
strategy against Huawei. Even before the signing of the 5G memorandum of
understanding, Poland made headlines when it arrested a Huawei employee who was
a suspected spy, in January 2019. During his meeting with Vice President Mike
Pence, Polish President Andrzej Duda brought up the issue of Chinese spying in
Poland. And yet, one year after his arrest, the trial against the suspected spy
still hasn’t begun.
How Russia Brought Central and Eastern European Countries
Closer to the United States
Poland had already tried to show its commitment to the
United States when it proposed to President Donald Trump the construction of “Fort
Trump” in Poland, a military base that, if constructed, will host around 1,000
American troops. The proposal was part of a larger strategy of beefing up its
defense ties with the United States in recent years. In 2019, Poland began the
boldest military modernization in its history. The effort is the signature
program of Polish Minister of Defense Mariusz Błaszczak’s. It aims to spend
around $133 billion to buy new armaments and equipment by 2035. Its Harpia
program will replace Soviet aircraft with F-35A Lightning II stealth jets, with
the contract for 32 F-35 jets having been signed this year.
Estonia’s calculus was similar. With Russia posing an
existential threat, it would allow no daylight between itself and the United
States on any major issue. Estonia, which won the status of the first digital
country in the world, fears security vulnerabilities in its digital systems to
the same extent that it fears losing its U.S. military shield against Russia —
a shield that China can’t replace. Estonia has learned the importance of cyber
security the hard way, having been the victim of a massive cyber attack in
2007. One year later, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence
was inaugurated in Estonia.
Estonia is also investing heavily in its military systems.
In 2018, it launched the “Defense Investment Program” to cover existing
equipment gaps in its military forces. Last year, it signed a five-year defense
cooperation agreement with the United States, while Estonian President Kersti
Kaljulaid called for U.S. troops to be deployed to her country.
In any dispute between the United States and China, the
choice for most countries in Central and Eastern Europe is easy — side with
Washington. Because of Russia, Poland, Romania, and Estonia have all signed
memoranda of understanding with Washington regarding Huawei and have had
rotational deployments of NATO troops on their territory over the past few
years. Romania already has two U.S. military facilities and Poland is aiming
for one, the aforementioned “Fort Trump.” Romania and Poland have each invested
around $4 billion to acquire Patriot missile defense batteries and they also
host Aegis Ashore radars and SM-3 anti-ballistic missiles. (While the site in
Romania has been operational since 2016, the one in Poland is still under
construction.) In 2019, Romania temporarily hosted a THAAD anti-missile defense
system.
The Russian fear is also highlighted by the amount of money
each country is spending on its military. All three spend more than 2 percent
of GDP on defense — making them all part of the select 2 percent club, made up
of only a third of NATO’s members, almost all of which are in Russia’s
proximity. The five largest relative military budget increases since 2014 have
all taken place in Central and Eastern
European countries.
Just as the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia led to
the creation of a strong Romanian defense industry according to one Romanian
general, so the annexation of Crimea has also refocused the Romanian
government’s attention on the urgent goal of strengthening its military, with
the United States as vital partner. Since 2014, Romania has acquired 12 F-16
Fighting Falcons, seven Patriot missile defense systems, and three M142 High
Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, among other major platforms.
The Russian Factor in U.S.-China Competition in Central and
Eastern Europe
China has found itself caught in the middle of these
geopolitical and military developments that are strongly connected to the
perceived threat from Russia. In recent years, China and Russia have developed
closer relations, something that has reverberated negatively in China’s
relationship with Central and Eastern European countries leading to concerns
about intelligence sharing between the two powers. In such a scenario, the
risks of using Huawei 5G equipment are far more serious because, while Central
and Eastern European countries would probably never find themselves in a
conflict with China, a military confrontation with Russia is a real
possibility. Although countries like Greece or Hungary aren’t so concerned
about Russia, those that are physically closer to Russia value their U.S.
security guarantee more than potential economic investments. In this context,
China’s image as Russia’s great-power ally hasn’t been very helpful.
This points to the apparent failure of the 17+1 mechanism
between China and Central and Eastern European countries, which is due to the
fact that China failed to understand the “Russian factor” in Central and
Eastern Europe. The 17+1 is a mechanism set up in 2012 between China and 16
Central and Eastern European countries (with Greece joining in 2019) in order
to facilitate the arrival of Chinese investments and technology in the region.
While it holds annual summits between heads of government or state, the
mechanism didn’t succeed in achieving its goals, as many Chinese projects are
at a standstill or under negotiation even seven years after their announcement.
While China may hold leverage in the form of some
unfulfilled investments, the United States is the security guarantee that can
keep Central and Eastern Europe free from the perceived Russian threat. That is
why the United States succeeded in signing its first anti-Huawei memorandum of
understanding in Eastern, not Western, Europe. In this region, the United
States has more leverage than China, something the United States doesn’t have
with larger European countries. On the contrary, Western European countries
have stronger economic and commercial ties to China, which increases Beijing’s
influence in the 5G issue. Take, for example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s
desire not to restrict Huawei’s access to the 5G network or the United
Kingdom’s recent decision to allow Huawei to participate in building the U.K.
network, excluding it only from the network’s core and implementing a cap on
its market share. Considerations about China’s possible response against a
Huawei ban have played an important role in these decisions.
Conclusion
America is the pivotal ally of Central and Eastern European
countries that fear Russia as a security threat. It was this “Russian factor”
that led several of these countries to side with Washington over China and
Huawei, which now find themselves squeezed out of a region that they once
considered favorable terrain. The United States took advantage of its influence
in Central and Eastern Europe and the fear of Russia, scoring some of its most
important victories against Huawei in the region.
The memoranda of understanding between the United States and
Romania, Poland, and Estonia are an important part of the American strategy to
contain Huawei. However, the lack of legal follow-up in each country, and
America’s failure to sign such memoranda of understanding with larger
countries, highlight the limitations of Washington’s strategy. At the very
least, however, the memoranda of understanding are proof of the partial failure
of China’s Central and Eastern European strategy and its 17+1 mechanism, as
Beijing failed to understand how much the region fears Russia and depends on
U.S. security guarantees.
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