Baltic Intelligence Agencies Increasingly Worry About Threats From China in Addition to Russia
In mid-March, the State Security Service (VDD) of Latvia
published its annual public report. “While the new coronavirus COVID-19 disease
has for some time brought other priorities to the forefront of public safety,
national security issues remain relevant,” said VDD Chief Normunds Mežviets
(Vdd.gov.lv, March 17).
Similar reports were issued earlier this year by the
Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) (Valisluureamet.ee, February 12)
and the State Security Department as well as the Second Investigative
Department under the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense (Vsd.lt, February
24). Crucially, while all three countries’ intelligence services once again
highlighted threats from Russia, their annual reports additionally raised
growing concerns about hostile Chinese activities.
The EFIS report clearly declares, “The only existential
threat to Estonia’s sovereignty is a potential Russian military operation
against the Baltic States. Compared to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] forces, the balance of power on the Baltic States’ axis is
clearly tilted in favor of Russia.
Even discounting [the heavily militarized
Russian Baltic exclave of] Kaliningrad, Russia has absolute supremacy in terms
of offensive equipment—tanks, fighter aircraft and rocket artillery” (News.err,
February 12).
In turn, according to the Latvian VDD, Russian actions
against NATO and the European Union remained high over the past year. As a result,
counteracting Russia’s influential measures continued to set the agenda for VDD
actions.
According to its afore-cited March 2020 report, Russia continued to
pose the greatest challenge to Latvia’s counter-intelligence efforts over the
past year. These Russian threats originated not only from Russian territory
itself but also, via proxies (such as surreptitiously Moscow-backed transborder
criminal gangs), from a number of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
member countries. These Russian intelligence operations included not only
efforts to penetrate or more closely monitor strategically important companies
(such as those involved in constructing Rail Baltica) but also Latvian
municipalities and cross-border initiatives (Delfi.lv, March 17).
For example, in 2019, the VDD identified several potentially
threatening cross-border “cooperation” projects with local Russian entities. In
two cases, Latvian municipalities planned to implement environmental
cooperation projects with the Pskov regional administration and other
municipalities in Russia, involving the installation of video surveillance
cameras produced in Russia for monitoring natural resources and outdoor
recreational sites in the area.
However, as the report points out, these
project would have included, inter alia, the retention of video surveillance
data on Russian territory and the possibility of third parties to access the
video surveillance footage remotely (Vdd.gov.lv, March 17). The VDD concludes
that, at the tactical intelligence level, hostile foreign special services in
Latvia were interested in information about NATO Enhanced Forward Presence
(EFP) battlegroup personnel, their locations and capacities. Similarly,
information was gathered on the material resources of the EFP battlegroup
itself (Sargs.lv, March 17).
The Estonian intelligence report on incidents in 2019
expressed particular concern that Russian cyberattacks against the West “have
gone unpunished” and will continue in 2020. “As long as the potential benefits
outweigh the consequences, Russia is very likely to continue its use of cyber
operations,” the report says. “Russia prefers to target states and institutions
that have a low level of cyber security and possess sensitive information of
another country due to membership in an international organization”
(Estonianworld.com, February 14).
Meanwhile, thousands of Lithuanians took advantage last year
of Russia’s visa-free regime with neighboring Kaliningrad region. The
Lithuanian intelligence services suggest that this travel facilitation by
Russia in fact assists in Moscow’s recruitment of local spies from Lithuania.
The latest Lithuanian intelligence threats report warns that Russia receives
information about arriving foreigners and then checks if those individuals
possess valuable information or are vulnerable to recruitment. Particular
attention is given to “former and active politicians, businessmen, law
enforcement officers, military personnel, and journalists traveling to Russia,”
according to the report (BNN, February 6).
As of last year, Lithuania continued importing Russian
liquefied natural gas (LNG) from privately-owned gas producer Novatek. However,
these imports through the port of Klaipeda pose a risk to the country’s energy
independence, the intelligence report notes: “By increasing its trade turnover
via Klaipeda Terminal, Novatek is playing a part in Russia’s long-term game to
restore its dominant position in the regional gas market.” Novatek’s
shareholders include Gennady Tymchenko, a Russian oligarch who is believed to
belong to President Vladimir Putin’s closest circle of supporters and is
subject to United States sanctions (BNN, February 6).
Though the Russian threat remains most pressing, all three
Baltic countries are increasingly concerned about Chinese intelligence
activities in the region. As the VDD report points out, Chinese special
services are becoming more interested in Latvia. And in 2019, Latvian
counter-intelligence identified a number of influential activities primarily
designed to lobby domestically in favor of Chinese interests.
In the latest
issue of its annual report, the VDD emphasizes that Chinese interests are
primarily related to the use of its technologies in the private and public
sectors (Vdd.gov.lv, March 17). In turn, the current Estonian intelligence
threats report notes, “The potential use of China’s foreign investment for
political purposes and the possible development of technological dependency are
increasing threats to Estonia’s security” (Valisluureamet.ee, February 12).
This year, for the first time, Lithuanian intelligence
warned of China’s growing aggressive espionage inside the country. The
Lithuanian report points out that Chinese intelligence services actively seek
out new methods to connect with Lithuanian citizens and look for targets on the
career-focused social networking site LinkedIn during the early stages of
recruitment operations.
Estonian and Lithuanian intelligence services also both
warn about the potential investments coming from the Belt and Road Initiative,
and question the use of Chinese-made technology, such as 5G networks, which,
though cheaper and currently more advanced than Western technology, may, in the
long-run, prove less secure (Vsd.lt, February 24; Valisluureamet.ee, February
12). The Chinese embassy in Tallinn has, predictably, criticized the recent
Estonian security report, claiming that its characterizations of an alleged
Chinese security threat were based on ignorance, prejudice and a Cold War
mindset (Baltic-Course, February 18).
Nonetheless, according to the head of the
Lithuanian defense ministry’s Second Investigative Department, Colonel,
Remigijus Baltrėnas, the risk is related to the fact that existing Chinese law
requires Huawei and other state-controlled companies to share collected
information with Chinese intelligence services (BNN, February 6).
The now-familiar threats of hybrid warfare, espionage,
terrorism, extremism, cyber warfare, disinformation, fake news and populism
will of course continue to dominate the Baltic States’ security environment as
in past years.
But newly emerging concerns about China, in addition to the
developing global health pandemic, will require greater attention from the
Baltics’ intelligence services this year.
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